This is to "Anonymous of December 9th who speaks of generocity of spirt and A76":

It is preposterous to think of either A76 or Core Ops as being "committed to the Mission," "thoughtful," "strategic" and especially, as reflecting generocity of spirit or the spirt of the National Park Service.

Core Ops and A76 both arose from a political strategy of pitting the parks and the programs and the people of the NPS against each other. It worked. It was a race to the bottom. The smallest mindedness predominated. "Strategic?" Referring to core ops as 'strategic' is the most ridiculous of all. There was nothing strategic about it. Its purpose was to slash the bone of the National Park System and programs and to render the NPS a less effective, less admirable agency.

Charging a lack of transparency for carefully selected and leaked targets such as the Delaware Water Gap outhouse or Sperry was just a means to remove necessary management discretion in program management. When critical needs -- such as an environmental review for a pending court case or unusual engineering solutions to mitigate potential impairment of park resources -- often demanded by Congress or the courts intervened, and there was no line item to pay for the item, the professional offices of the NPS had to take on those projects in addition to the line item projects without waiting for additional appropriations. This kind of flexibility is necessary for effective management, & operates within existing authorizations and legislation. There is no need for congress to micromanage at this level, and other agencies with FAR larger budgets with LESS exacting Mission-related restrictions, have far MORE discretion in budget mangement. The packaging and promotion of many of these leaks of supposed unaccountability came from a disgruntled old dinosaur and regional manager from that part of the country trying to hang on to his preeminence. This is where the breakdown in 'graciousness' started showing itself in the successful right-wing tactic to turn one part of the NPS against another. Those who went for the bait had no strategy: nothing they were doing would enhance the programs or the funding needed by the NPS.

You say "Congress" demanded this. Interesting. Few in congress were engaged in this. It was hardly "Congress." It was mostly a staff-driven crusade by the most self-regarding, unelected staffers who felt senior park leaders with profound experience and judgement did not pander enough to these unelected staffers. The least politically sophisticated advocates of Core Ops and similar programs keep saying "Congress" asked for it, when no real congressional mandate was established, and the NPS 'leadership' never attempted to make a better case of better solution for the sake of the public interest. At first, Congressman Regula tried to stand outside of the whole orchestrated thing, until he too got dragged into it, and ended up endorsing and declaring the whole thing a victory for 'accountability.' When Director Stanton said that he personally would review each project at the Washington level, Mr. Regula even warned him that would be a waste of Washington's time and the Director's time, but the congressional staff had gotten to OMB and departmental staff and the damage was done. Thus began this incredibly expensive entirely wasteful series of top-down inquisitions, none of which had ANY strategy to them.

One real strategy would have been to forcefully explain why the funds and flexibility are needed, and the consequences of letting such staff-driven micromanagement go on. The NPS 'leadership,' instead of surrendering to the propaganda by adocating for harmful cuts, could have stood up and fight as NPS leaders had in the past. Can you imagine George Hartzog permitting this lack of management flexibility. Can you imagine him being intimadated by some dottering dinosaur? But they were intimidated, and the Bush administration hired the dinosaur's hatchet-person as Director of the NPS.

This could have been fought. NPS could have gone after the attacks. Afterall, this was not like Eisenhower standing up to Senator Joe McCarthy in the Army-McCarthy Hearings. Instead, every regional director -- non-political jobs -- was removed during the Bush Administration. Everyone did not roll over to Core ops, but this was no time for what used to be the standard courage of the NPS.

The most ridiculous charge is to say Core Ops would be the basis for funding increases. Just look at the NPS budgets during the time. The NPS asked for less money for park operations increases during this time than only the cost of the 'accountability' programs like Core Ops, maintenance consolidations and GPRA. The NPS even ACCEPTED OMB's proposal that meant the NPS COULD NOT EVEN ASK FOR FUNDING RESTORATION for activities stripped by cost of living increases or across-the-board cuts. Wake up! It did not MATTER what justification you had, if you were asking to restore a cut activity. Once cut, it was against the "rules" to request that funding to be restored. If there was any amount of real insight among tha advocates of this program, they were cynical and culpable. The rest were too inexperienced or too easily led to know any better.

If you had put the same amount of effort that went into Core ops and the really stupid way the NPS implemented GPRA, into strategies to build support among the American people -- or even just managing the parks -- the NPS would be way ahead today.

People are angry, not gracious, because of the stupidity and viciousness of this diversion of the spirit and purpose of the National Park Service.

Not to appear ungracious or malicious but you have an extremely naïve opinion on the implementation of Core Ops. I have gone through three of them in my tenure and each one was executed in an arbitrary way. In all three cases we were told what our outcomes would be regardless of analysis. IN each instance the park tried to develop its own priorities with varying success but the outcomes and final reports were all dramatically different than what the park originally wanted. When the superintendent was asked the response was always “Denver didn’t like it.”

A classic example is what happened in the Vanishing Treasures Program – a grass roots program developed by and run by parks in the IMR to deal with an ageing preservation work force, priceless prehistoric architectural sites needing emergency treatment, and a lack of resource professionals to deal with the boarder issues. The VT Program was a grass roots organization run by the parks in the IMR – not through the IMR office. From 1999 – 2004 the VT program successfully got Clinton and Bush administrations to fund the program to the tune of several million dollars and added over 62 resource professionals and craftspeople to the ranks. The program manager was base funded out of the FLAG areas. In 2004 the VT Program was Core Oped. The base funded program manager positions was pulled from FLAG (ONPS dollars removed) and reinstated in the IMR. Funding for positions dried up 100% (6 to 7 positions were getting funded in the old system) and now the program struggles for its very existence to dole out a few project dollars.

The program was viable and successful when run by the parks but dried up to nothing as soon as it was Core Oped and transferred to the IMR. Snyder had a personal history with the program manager and made this move as vindictive as possible. The program manager was removed from his job and the pulled funding was given to an IMR Curator was in turn losing her operations to Core Ops. See a theme…

So don’t tell me that Core Ops was a well thought out tool to financial sustainability. It may have had its origins like that but it was used vindictively and destroyed successful parks and programs and actually made them less efficient and more costly while reducing benefits to visitors and resources.

Your naïveté is too much to bear. I’m sorry.

Dear NPS Colleagues and NPT Friends,
I am an employee who lost my job as a part of Core Operations in an IMR park.
I was forced to move in order to stay employed. The move has caused me and my family immeasurable hardship. Reading this long series of comments is both cathartic but intensely painful as well. I have reeled from the highs of seeing our story finally told - to the depths of despair at reliving our shared experiences through the posts here. I suspect that many of you can relate to this mix of feelings. After all, we are part of the same family – the National Park Service Family.
I deeply appreciate Kurt giving all of us a forum to have a voice for we have not had one in nearly four years in the IMR. That is changing now with the turn of the Administration and a new skilled and compassionate Director. I suggest that we consider ending the cyber blood letting for the good of the agency we love so much. Our story has been told, our voices heard and the winds of change are blowing.
Let's re-commit ourselves to our agency's noble mission and in the spirit of Horace Albright's wise dictate.
“Do not let the service become just another Government bureau; keep it youthful, vigorous, clean and strong.”

Well put, Anonymous! I hear you and completely understand where you are coming from and what you are feeling. I too have moved on, but not without a few scars and a case of PTSD; but this has been helpful and most interesting, especially in confirming from good sources what many of us had always known by facts and in our guts to be the case.

I like the hopeful tone in the voices of those who remain behind, but it's almost too euphoric and giddy, the sound of someone who just missed a bullet. I'd advise you not to get too comfy and let your guards down too far. Use this time to shore up the foundations again; and don't forget the next election is only 3 years away! Part of me wishes I was still onboard- have a good ride!

So- what's next? Please tell me the [Government Performance and Results Act] (GPRA) is the next to fall! That would make my day!

Spot on -sadly PTSD is exactly what so many of us have been silently struggling with who were Core Oped.
I received this diagnosis from my physician two years ago. I didn't pursue it thru work channels as I figured what was the point. I just had to deal with it on my own and heal myself as best I could. But it is ironic to think about the IMR regional director's demanding performance requirement of zero employee on the job injuries, accidents and illnesses and the penalizing assessments IMR parks pay to the IMR region every time a park has a "reportable" accident, injury and occupational triggered illness. It would be staggering to calculate how many former and present IMR employees who were core oped share this wrenching job triggered PTSD reality. Hopefully there will be some accountability for the incalculable human damage.

A career NPS ranger friend of mine has been reading this thread of posts and has also heard lots of offline talk about how the NPS will soon change for the better. Noticing the abundance of "Anonymous" postings above from present and former NPS colleagues, here is what was sent to me:

"When we no longer feel intimidated to use our names when we submit comments, I'll know that change within the NPS is real."

Owen Hoffman
Oak Ridge, TN 37830

In the midst of the debate about how much money has been spent in different ways and at different levels of the Park Service, it's interesting to go to http://php.app.com/fed_employees/search.php and just compare some numbers.

For instance, if you look at the salaries of all the employees of the Intermountain Regional Office and the Denver Service Center, it shows in fiscal year 2008 there were 543 employees .......and 24% earned more than $100,000 and 64% earned more than $75,000.

If you combine the numbers for Mesa Verde National Park and Yosemite National Park---one of our typical medium-sized parks and one of our larger parks---you end up with 993 employees....and of these only 1.5 % earned more than $100,000 and 6% earned more than $75,000. (Based on the web site's statistics: at Mesa Verde NP one person earned over $100,000 and 9 others earned between $75,000 and $100,000; and at Yosemite NP there were 819 employees with 14 earning over $100,000 and 36 earning between $75,000 and $100,000.)

These numbers include all employees---full time permanent and summer seasonals. If we try to eliminate the seasonal employees, then Mesa Verde NP had approximately 60 year-round employees and Yosemite NP had approximately 400. That results in a combined full time staff in the two parks of 460 people with 3% earning over $100,000 and 13% earning over $75,000.

Statistics like these obviously raise questions: How many people really are necessary to support our parks and to support the mission of the Park Service? And how much should they be paid?

Perhaps as Director Jarvis and others begin to look carefully at budgets, at the possibility of future budget restraints and challenges, and at where to devote time, money, and energy in the next decade, they should begin to ask: do we need so many people at the middle management levels of the Park Service? Do we need so many disproportionately well paid people? And what regional services really are necessary, and how much should be spent for those services in comparison to the programs, preservation activities and visitor services that are necessary in our parks?

To Anonymous on Dec 10, 2009.
You wrote "In 2004 the VT Program was Core Oped. The base funded program manager positions was pulled from FLAG (ONPS dollars removed) and reinstated in the IMR."

The ONPS funds were not removed. FLAG kept the funds but the superintendent chose not to spend on VT.